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A WEALTH TAX: TAXING THE ESTATES OF 
THE LIVING 
DAVID J. SHAKOW* 
Abstract: It has now been one hundred years since the passage of the first es-
tate tax, and since that time the size and complexity of the federal tax system 
has only continued to grow. In the face of that complexity it is worthwhile for 
the United States to begin considering alternatives. Do we continue with our 
system of income and consumption taxation, or do we turn to a wealth tax? A 
wealth tax is sometimes criticized as being too complex, but there are reasons 
to suggest it is no more complex than our current system—and possibly even 
less complex. When analyzed, the main source of contention—valuation—is 
not actually as onerous as it seems. A wealth tax of about 1.6% may ultimately 
engender little opposition from taxpayers. Accordingly, this Article argues that 
the merits of a wealth tax are worth considering, and its drawbacks not insur-
mountable. 
INTRODUCTION 
The estate tax was first passed in 1916.1 Congress’s concern in passing 
the estate tax is made clear in the House Committee report: “What taxes can 
be levied that will be sufficient to meet the needs of the Treasury and at the 
same time place the least burden upon the people who are compelled to pay 
them and keep the burden of taxation equitably distributed?”2 
Congress was looking to make the tax burden “equitable.” At that time, 
over eighty-five percent of federal collections consisted of consumption 
taxes: import duties and various excise taxes including taxes on tobacco and 
liquor, and stamp taxes, including taxes on playing cards.3 The Committee 
report added that “[n]o civilized nation collects so large a part of its reve-
nues through consumption taxes as does the United States, and it is conced-
ed by all that such taxes bear most heavily upon those least able to pay 
                                                                                                                           
 © 2016, David J. Shakow. All rights reserved. 
 * Gabelli Fellow, Gabelli Graduate School of Business, Fordham University; Professor, 
Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. 
 1 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, §§ 200–212, 39 Stat. 756, 777–80 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 2 H.R. REP. NO. 64-922 (1916), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 22, 23 (1939). 
 3 For data on federal revenues from 1789 to 1945, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1789–1945, at 295–98 (1949), http://www2.census.gov/
library/publications/1949/compendia/hist_stats_1789-1945/hist_stats_1789-1945-chP.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9YZE-ZC23]. 
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them.”4 After noting that Great Britain collected more than half of its reve-
nue from income and inheritance taxes the Committee added: 
It is probable that no country in the world derives as much reve-
nue per capita from its people through consumption taxes as does 
the United States. It is therefore deemed proper that, in meeting 
the extraordinary expenditures for the Army and Navy, our reve-
nue system should be more evenly and equitably balanced and a 
larger portion of our necessary revenues collected from the in-
comes and inheritances of those deriving the most benefit and 
protection from the Government.5 
Congress’s solution was an inheritance tax.6 But once the United States en-
tered World War I, even the inheritance tax was not enough of a supplement 
to the consumption taxes to finance the war, and the United States turned to 
a much broader income tax than it imposed previously.7 It is worth appreci-
ating, however, what led Congress to impose the estate tax in 1916. Con-
gress, as expressed in the Committee report, was concerned with the equity 
of the tax system, and was looking for a way to impose the tax burden on 
“those deriving the most benefit and protection from the Government.”8 
With that in mind, it is fair to ask what Congress concluded best 
measures the benefits and protections derived from the government. Apply-
ing the tax to estates suggests that those who have died in the current year 
(or their heirs) best fit that category. But presumably Congress did not con-
clude that the best indicator of someone’s benefiting from the government 
was his or her death in the current year. It would seem that Congress intro-
duced the estate tax because it felt that those with large holdings of wealth 
had benefitted from protection from the government in the past. This sug-
gests that the estate tax was a surrogate for a wealth tax.9 The visceral ar-
gument for a wealth tax remains to this day. When Warren Buffett criticizes 
                                                                                                                           
 4 H.R. REP. NO. 64-922, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 23. 
 5 Id. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See generally Revenue Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-50, 40 Stat. 300 (1917) (imposing a 
variety of new taxes in order to fund the Unites States’ involvement in World War I). 
 8 See H.R. REP. NO. 64-922, reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) at 23. 
 9 A wealth tax as such was apparently not considered, probably because the need to value 
property annually seemed too daunting. That perception may be changing. There has been much 
renewed interest in a wealth tax generated by recent scholarship. See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, 
CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014). An estate tax has 
an advantage, because compared to an annual wealth tax, its imposition is normally not precisely 
expected; thus, it is less subject to planning. See Alan Auerbach, The Future of Capital Income 
Taxation, 27 FISCAL STUD. 399, 417 (2006) (noting that an estate tax captures unintended be-
quests when a person holds onto assets to prepare for future expenses but dies having not encoun-
tered such expenses). 
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our current system because he pays tax at a lower rate than his secretary, he 
may well be appealing to the idea that wealth, rather than income, is a fairer 
way of gauging who should support our government.10 The “Buffett Rule” 
is a tax on income, but it is phrased as a tax imposed on millionaires, a term 
traditionally based on wealth.11 
In any event, when the needs of government escalated dramatically 
with the entrance of the United States into World War I, Congress expanded 
the individual income tax that it had first passed in 1913.12 Presumably it 
relied on the income tax, rather than any form of wealth tax, because it ap-
pears much easier to measure income than to determine each individual’s 
wealth. 
After more than one hundred years of experience with the income tax, 
that presumption is worth reexamining. Although it may still seem difficult 
to evaluate everyone’s wealth, the growth in size and complexity of the fed-
eral income tax suggests that measuring income may not be as easy as was 
first believed. That is not to suggest that measuring wealth would be easy. 
The point of this exercise is to compare the complexity of the wealth tax 
with the complexity of our income tax.  
Accordingly, Part I addresses the question of why the United States 
should consider a wealth tax in the first place.13 Part II provides a brief 
overview of the structure of the present wealth tax proposal.14 Part III con-
fronts potential valuation concerns and explains why those difficult valua-
tions are not actually fatal for a wealth tax.15 Part IV analyzes the problem 
created by distinguishing income from capital and labor, by way of compar-
isons to how Nordic tax systems address the problem.16 Part V looks at pos-
sible economic effects of a wealth tax.17 Part VI argues that the low rate 
imposed under the wealth tax is unlikely to generate significant negative 
consequences, as evidenced by behavior in relation to local property tax 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See Chris Isidore, Buffett Says He’s Still Paying Lower Tax Rate Than His Secretary, CNN 
MONEY (Mar. 4, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/04/news/economy/buffett-secretary-taxes/ 
[https://perma.cc/L5VS-GY2Y]. Note that the assertion relates to Buffett’s rate, not the amount of 
tax he pays. See id. 
 11 See Jeanne Sahadi, The Buffett Rule Is Back, CNN MONEY (Feb. 2, 2015), http://money.cnn.
com/2015/02/02/pf/taxes/obama-buffett-rule/ [https://perma.cc/54TT-DCSA]; see also Millionaire, 
MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/millionaire [https://
perma.cc/LM53-9K3V] (noting that “millionaire” is a term based on wealth). 
 12 Compare S. REP. 64-793 (1916), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 28, 29 (1939) (estimating 
the estate tax would raise $65 million per annum when fully phased in), with S. REP. 65-103 
(1917), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 56, 70 (1939) (estimating new war income tax to raise 
over $777 million and new war profits tax to raise $562 million). 
 13 See infra notes 21–24 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 25–32 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 33–63 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 64–90 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 91–100 and accompanying text. 
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assessments.18 Part VII answers additional concerns raised by a wealth tax, 
such as problems of liquidity and constitutionality.19 Finally, Part VIII pro-
vides an overall evaluation of this wealth tax proposal.20 
I. WHY BOTHER WITH A WEALTH TAX? 
In deciding whether to rely on an income tax or a wealth tax, it is 
worth recognizing that there is a significant difference in complexity be-
tween the two. In the development of the income tax, we have seen that the 
distinctions that must be made require significant training and intellectual 
input in order to satisfy taxpayers that they are finding the most tax-efficient 
way of structuring their affairs. As a result, important intellectual resources 
of society are devoted to compliance with the income tax. If, in fact, the 
complexity of a wealth tax can be restricted to issues of valuation, the com-
plexity that must be dealt with is at a lower level than the complexity of the 
income tax. It is easier to value a building than to decide whether a transac-
tion satisfies § 355 of the Internal Revenue Code.21 It has been suggested 
that “[a]ny system requiring appraisals is likely to be a loss for the govern-
ment because it does not have the resources to win.”22 That argument has 
much more force where the issues are more complex, as they are in the in-
come tax. In other words, it is more likely that the Internal Revenue Service 
(“IRS”), with limited resources, will be able to match the skills of taxpay-
ers’ advisors under a system based on appraisals than it can under our cur-
rent complicated income tax law.23 Moreover, local property taxes, which 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 101–123 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 124–138 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 139–148 and accompanying text. 
 21 A suggestive comparison is salaries of tax lawyers and salaries of people who value real 
estate and businesses. The median salary and bonus of a senior residential real estate appraiser is 
$66,149. Appraiser Sr. (Residential Real Estate) Salaries, SALARY.COM, http://www1.salary.com/
Appraiser-Sr-Residential-Real-Estate-Salaries.html [https://perma.cc/K9E2-Q8TZ]. For commer-
cial real estate, the figure is $91,525. Appraiser (Commercial Real Estate) Salaries, SALARY.COM, 
http://www1.salary.com/Appraiser-Commercial-Real-Estate-Salaries.html [https://perma.cc/G8AW-
H8AM]. The median salary and bonus of the highest ranked “Collateral Appraiser” (one “respon-
sible for conducting complex appraisals and property ratings in conjunction with investment in 
equity and loans”) is $107,093. Collateral Appraiser III, SALARY.COM, http://swz.salary.com/
SalaryWizard/Collateral-Appraiser-III-Salary-Details.aspx [https://perma.cc/FB5C-J48F]. The medi-
an salary and bonus of a tax attorney ranges from $97,609 for the least experienced to $204,543 for 
the most experienced. Tax Attorney I Salaries, SALARY.COM, http://www1.salary.com/Tax-
Attorney-I-Salary.html [https://perma.cc/PJ3B-2LHT]; Tax Attorney IV Salaries, SALARY.COM, 
http://www1.salary.com/Tax-Attorney-IV-Salary.html [https://perma.cc/P6TD-9D4Z]. 
 22 Noël B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without Realization: A “Revolution-
ary” Approach to Ownership, 47 TAX L. REV. 725, 743 n.78 (1992). 
 23 The salaries paid to tax lawyers and others in the real estate industry are evidence of their 
skill and the resources available to them. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (providing 
median salaries). 
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have been the mainstay of income for local governments for many years, 
survive despite the need for appraisals. 
In addition, to the extent that the wealth tax described in this Article 
leads to a flat tax rate on wealth that is around 1.6%, valuation issues must 
be quite great for taxpayers to pursue them very far. More generally, a tax 
with a low rate is less likely to attract tax planners than a high rate tax. That 
is a practical advantage of a wealth tax over the theoretically more popular 
consumption tax. Potentially, replacing the income tax with a wealth tax 
would lead to more productive uses of society’s assets. 
Part of the goal of this Article is to demonstrate that the obvious area 
of concern in adopting a wealth tax—the difficulty of valuation—is signifi-
cantly less severe for the vast majority of assets than might be feared. Con-
sequently, it is fair to imagine that such a wealth tax is practicable. If con-
cerns about valuation can be overcome, the discussion of the practicality of 
a wealth tax can shift to the question of whether a wealth tax as described 
below can avoid the type of complexity that has grown up around the in-
come tax. In particular, the issue that may be most difficult is distinguishing 
income from labor and income from capital. Although that issue raises seri-
ous problems that require additional investigation, it already arises under 
the income tax, and it is a significant problem for tax systems that have 
been functioning for over twenty years in Finland and the Scandinavian 
countries.24 In other words, it seems reasonable to conclude that a function-
ing tax system can cope with the issue. 
II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE WEALTH TAX 
Professor Reed Shuldiner and this author have previously proposed a 
wealth tax.25 The proposed wealth tax was structured with a number of con-
straints.26 It was intended to replace both the individual and the corporate 
income tax and to leave the burden on labor and the burden on capital 
roughly the same as under current law.27 
The wealth tax described had two components. One was a flat tax on 
net worth.28 The other was a flat tax on wages.29 A tax on wages can be fit 
under the rubric of a wealth tax if viewed as a surrogate for a wealth tax on 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 66–89 and accompanying text (discussing dual-income tax systems). 
 25 See generally David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. 
REV. 499 (2000) (proposing a wealth tax). 
 26 See id. at 499–500. 
 27 See id. 
 28 Id. at 546–50. 
 29 Id. 
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human capital.30 The base case described excluded from net worth items 
that currently are not substantially subject to income tax—most importantly, 
people’s homes and their tax-favored retirement savings.31 
Operating with those constraints, the authors showed that such a tax—
with a flat tax on wages of less than 18% and a flat tax on net worth of 
about 1.6%—would satisfy the criteria described above, taking into account 
the use of a credit against the calculated tax liability to provide some pro-
gressivity in the tax structure.32 
III. THE VALUATION ISSUE 
There is no question that the valuation issue is the one that people con-
sidering a wealth tax find most troubling. For example, several scholars, in 
their discussion of the base for direct taxation, assume that the annual 
measurement of wealth is not available, noting that “[whereas] the values of 
some types of wealth are readily measureable, others are not.”33 
It is easier to respond to critics who point to specific problems with 
valuation. One scholar, discussing the possibility of a wealth tax, lists the 
following assets as being hard to value (noting percentages of all assets held 
by persons with at least $2 million of gross assets)34: 
  
                                                                                                                           
 30 It is appropriate to consider the place of human capital in the context of a wealth tax. About 
one-third of Professors Joseph Bankman and Daniel Shaviro’s review of Thomas Piketty’s Capital 
in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 9, is devoted to human capital in the context of a wealth 
tax. See Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, Piketty in America: A Tale of Two Literatures 48–72 
(N.Y. Univ. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Working Pa-
per No. 14-31, Nov. 3, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2518586 [https://
perma.cc/2RUQ-U3HE]. 
 31 Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 25, at 533–38. 
 32 Id. at 561–62. 
 33 James Banks & Peter Diamond, The Base for Direct Taxation, in DIMENSIONS OF TAX 
DESIGN: THE MIRRLEES REVIEW 548, 553 n.7 (Stuart Adam et al. eds., 2010). Alan Viard, dis-
cussing the related valuation issues that arise in mark-to-market income tax proposals, is more 
blunt, saying “[t]hose proposals, which resort to a variety of questionable ad hoc methods to im-
pute market values, clearly extend mark-to-market taxation beyond its reasonable bounds.” Alan 
Viard, Moving Away from the Realization Principle, 145 TAX NOTES 847, 852 n.16 (2014). Full 
disclosure requires noting that one of the proposals Viard refers to is the present author’s sugges-
tion of a market-to-market system under the income tax. David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Real-
ization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1118–19 (1986). 
 34 David Kamin, How to Tax the Rich, 146 TAX NOTES 119, 123 (2015) (citing Brian Raub & 
Joseph Newcomb, Personal Wealth, 2007, 31 STAT. INCOME BULL., no. 3, Winter 2012, at 156, 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12pwwinbulwealth07.pdf [https://perma.cc/NN7W-CRGH]). The 
percentages, derived from estate tax returns, are not necessarily compatible with other figures, 
such as the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds figures. The precise percentages are not important, 
however; the point here is to identify those assets that a critic of a wealth tax considers hard to 
value. 
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Real estate 22% 
Closely held stock 12% 
Noncorporate business assets 7% 
Farm assets 3% 
Private equity and hedge funds 3% 
Other (other limited partnerships, art) 2% 
An examination of the assets in these categories, as provided below, will 
reduce critics’ concerns about valuing them. 
A. Real Estate 
The first, and largest, category of assets that must be valued is real es-
tate. Constituting twenty-two percent of all assets,35 real estate is already 
widely subject to tax in the United States based on value. Of course, local 
property taxes are not precise and raise issues that lead to disputes involving 
the value of the real estate. Local governments, however, have been able to 
enforce a property tax since colonial times.36 
Websites, such as Zillow, allow anyone to obtain estimates of values of 
most real estate in the United States. Zillow claims a national median error 
rate of 7.9%.37 Because Zillow uses a proprietary valuation method, there is 
no independent test of this claim. A study of real estate appraisals in large 
sales in liquidation concluded that, for appraisals made within a year of the 
liquidation sale, the ratio of appraised value to gross proceeds was off by 
about 27.6%.38 The great majority of errors were on the high side, however, 
which may be a function of a failure to take proper account of the fact that 
the properties were being sold on liquidation.39 
The fact that the valuation numbers used in property tax administration 
(and in websites like Zillow) are not precise means that there will be disa-
greements between taxpayers and administrators; but this issue does not 
appear to raise an insurmountable problem of administering a property tax. 
In part, this is probably because the rates that are applied in enforcing the 
property tax are low. Data collected and analyzed by the Minnesota De-
partment of Revenue show that the ratio of property taxes to value ranges 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Kamin, supra note 34, at 123. 
 36 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 2–3 (5th ed. 1988).  
 37 How Accurate Is the Zestimate?, ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/zestimate/#acc [https://
perma.cc/R4U9-92XW]. 
 38 Brian Olasov & K.C. Conway, Valuing Appraisals: Evidence from the CMBS Industry, 14 
CRE FINANCE WORLD, no. 1, Winter 2012, at 35, 37 (noting $2.1 billion in absolute value of 
errors compared to $7.6 billion gross proceeds). 
 39 See id. at 36. 
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from 4.040% to 0.117% for urban homes, with an average of about 1.5%.40 
For urban commercial properties, the rates range from 4.215% to 0.692%, 
with an average of about 2.1%.41 For urban industrial properties, the range 
is 3.972% to 0.512%, with an average around 1.55%.42 The average for ru-
ral homes is about 1.3%; for rural commercial, around 1.7%; and for rural 
industrial, around 1.25%.43 
Because we are dealing with a wealth tax at a rate of around 1.6%, it 
should be realized that a disagreement on the order of $250,000 in value 
would lead to a tax dispute on the order of $4000. When the tax rate is low, 
valuation issues become much less significant, unless there is a very large 
dispute over the value of the property. 
Also, in contrast to the operation of local property taxes, the taxpayer 
under our wealth tax (as under the income tax) sets a figure, and it is up to 
the IRS to challenge it.44 The IRS could use local property tax figures as an 
indication of whether the taxpayer’s figure is reasonable. It is also possible 
that the IRS could combine forces with local governments to improve valu-
ations. It should be remembered that this wealth tax would not be applied to 
owner-occupied homes, which reduces the scope of the valuation issue as it 
pertains to real estate.45 
B. Closely Held Stock, Noncorporate Business Assets, and  
Private Equity and Hedge Funds 
1. In General 
Closely held stock, noncorporate business assets, and private equity 
and hedge funds, which together constitute another twenty-two percent of 
assets,46 would appear to raise a more serious problem. Although those as-
sets certainly are valued by potential investors, one could imagine that the 
                                                                                                                           
 40 LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY & MINN. CTR. FOR FISCAL EXCELLENCE, 50-STATE 
PROPERTY TAX COMPARISON STUDY 14 (2015), https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/3550_
2891_Pay_2014_PT_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH8J-5H7S] [hereinafter LINCOLN INST.]. This 
is the average of the rates in the largest city of each state, plus the District of Columbia, New York 
City, and Chicago, for homes worth $150,000. Id. For $300,000 homes, the average is around 
1.56%. Id. at 15. Although the figures cover only the largest city in each state, it is likely that 
those cities’ rates are near the higher end of the state. Telephone Interview with Aaron Twite, 
Research Dir., Minn. Ctr. for Fiscal Excellence (Mar. 30, 2015) (stating his opinion based on his 
particular knowledge of the state and work on the 50-State Property Tax Comparison Study). 
 41 LINCOLN INST., supra note 40, at 18. 
 42 Id. at 20. 
 43 Id. at 1, 4, 6. 
 44 See generally Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 25 (proposing a wealth tax that would fol-
low procedures currently used for the income and estate tax). 
 45 Id. at 535–37. 
 46 Kamin, supra note 34, at 123. 
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differences in valuation would be significant, and that the numbers involved 
will be large enough to lead to disputes, even in the wealth-tax system at a 
rate of 1.6%. Moreover, valuing a business is a lot more complicated than 
valuing a parcel of real estate, and would require more resources. 
A preliminary valuation of a business reportedly costs $3000 to 
$10,000.47 In contrast, an appraisal of a home costs around $300 on aver-
age.48 Books giving guidance to those who would value a business can be 
quite weighty.49 A wealth-tax system might look to shortcuts to reduce dis-
putes in this area, for example by prescribing a particular method to use to 
value a business. Any such attempt at a shortcut, however, will undoubtedly 
encourage manipulation of whatever limited factors are given for valuation. 
There are theoretical auction models which allow one high bidder to buy an 
asset if its owner undervalues it,50 but such a solution probably cannot work 
politically.51 Presumably, if the need for valuing businesses increases, more 
efficient approaches to valuing businesses will be developed. Nevertheless, 
this is undoubtedly an area of concern. 
In deciding whether this valuation issue makes a wealth tax infeasible 
one should compare the estimate of the inaccuracy of such valuations with 
the state of income tax enforcement for privately held businesses. In 2007, 
the U.S. Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) issued a report on the 
tax gap.52 They concluded that, in the case of sole proprietors, only 43% of 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Karen E. Klein, Is It Worth Getting a Valuation for Your Small Business?, BLOOMBERG (June 9, 
2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-06-09/is-it-worth-getting-a-valuation-for-your-
small-business [https://perma.cc/BW5D-ZUBG] (citing a study by independent research firm IBIS-
World). 
 48 This figure is reported on the HomeAdvisor web site, based on reports they have received. 
How Much Does It Cost to Hire a Property Appraiser?, HOMEADVISOR, http://www.homeadvisor.
com/cost/inspectors-and-appraisers/hire-a-property-appraiser [https://perma.cc/LSN2-AC9V]. 
 49 See, e.g., SHANNON P. PRATT & ALINA V. NICULITA, VALUING A BUSINESS: THE ANALY-
SIS AND APPRAISAL OF CLOSELY HELD COMPANIES (5th ed. 2008) (providing over 1100 pages of 
information); see also DAVID LARO & SHANNON P. PRATT, BUSINESS VALUATION AND FEDERAL 
TAXES: PROCEDURE, LAW, AND PERSPECTIVE (2d ed. 2011) (providing 482 pages of infor-
mation). 
 50 These models stem from “Vickrey auctions,” with the academic literature following Wil-
liam Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1961). 
 51 That may be overly pessimistic. For example, a variation of the Vickrey auction is used by 
the Federal Communications Commission to sell radio spectrum licenses. See Jonathan Levin & 
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Are Dynamic Vickrey Auctions Practical?: Properties of the Combinatorial 
Clock Auction 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20,487, Sept. 2014), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w20487 [https://perma.cc/4US5-2DQW]. 
 52 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1014, TAX GAP: A STRAT-
EGY FOR REDUCING THE GAP SHOULD INCLUDE OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING SOLE PROPRIETOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/265399.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SNB-
SDJ5] (describing findings of a tax gap for sole proprietorships and proposing solutions); Susan 
Cleary Morse et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37 (2009) 
(referencing the GAO report on the sole proprietorship tax gap within a qualitative analysis of tax 
evasion).
*
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income was being reported.53 Although sole proprietors obviously do not 
constitute the full 22% of assets represented by closely held businesses, 
noncorporate business assets, and private equity and hedge funds, it seems 
reasonable to assume that if sole proprietors are reporting only 43% of in-
come, these other private businesses are not reporting substantially more on 
average. Accordingly, although these assets may be difficult to value, it is 
not unreasonable to assume that such valuations will be more successful 
than the current income tax system in capturing an appropriate tax liability 
for these assets. 
2. Minority Interests and Closely Held Businesses 
In the context of a wealth tax, the sum of all ownership interests 
should equal the value of the entity as a whole. Valuation issues arise, how-
ever, when ownership interests in an entity are divided up in complicated 
ways. For example, a partnership may have elaborate rules for allocating 
profits and losses. Alternatively, the ownership of a closely held corporation 
could be structured in such a way that some minority interests may be dis-
counted because of their minority position, whereas majority positions may 
properly demand a premium. Measuring those discounts and premia is very 
difficult. 
Valuing ownership interests is particularly problematic in the context 
of closely held businesses.54 Involving the entity itself in the solution could 
ameliorate the valuation issue. For example, a procedure somewhat similar 
to the partnership audit structure could be adopted.55 Closely held entities 
might be required to provide the IRS with the valuations that their owners 
have placed on the owners’ interests in the entity. The IRS could then decide 
to challenge those valuations, based on its determination of the value of the 
entity as a whole when compared to the sum of the values the owners have 
placed on their interests in the entity. If the owners of any entity did not 
wish to deal with the valuation issue in that manner, the entity could pay the 
flat-rate tax on its own value, thus avoiding any issue of how the tax should 
be apportioned among the owners of the entity. The underlying principle is 
that the value of an enterprise cannot be reduced by its owners carving up 
their interests in a particular way. 
                                                                                                                           
 53 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 1 (estimating that sole proprietors 
misreport 57% of their income). 
 54 Note the length of the books on valuing closely held businesses. See supra note 49 and 
accompanying text. 
 55 I.R.C. §§ 6221–6234 (2012). Although the partnership is not the taxpayer, it may deal with 
the IRS on an audit in some circumstances. 
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C. Farms, Other Limited Partnerships, and Art 
Farm assets raise problems similar to real estate and, along with other 
limited partnerships, present issues resembling those relating to closely held 
businesses discussed above.56 
Additionally, artwork and similar assets present special problems be-
cause they are unique and often very valuable. The IRS uses an Art Adviso-
ry Panel to evaluate art works for purposes of the income, estate, and gift 
taxes.57 Any work with a claimed value of $50,000 or more is reviewed by 
this Panel.58 Under a wealth tax there would be substantially more items to 
evaluate. It is unlikely, however, that the increase in evaluations will in-
crease the number of challenges by taxpayers. With a 1.6% wealth tax, a 
$50,000 item results in only $800 of tax. For each $1000 of disagreement 
between the IRS and taxpayers, only $16 of tax is implicated. Once initial 
valuations are determined for assets, it is not likely that there would be 
many significant disagreements (at $16 of tax per $1000 of disagreement) 
about changes from year to year. The initial valuation process would likely 
present a significant burden to the IRS. Initially, it might rely on the figures 
taxpayers used in insuring their works of art and similar objects. It is worth 
noting that works of art constitute less than 1% of all personal assets in the 
United States, and are held mostly by the wealthiest taxpayers.59 
D. Retirement Accounts 
To the extent they would be treated as assets of a taxpayer, retirement 
accounts would be difficult to value because of the uncertainty as to when 
the taxpayer would make use of the funds. In developing the original wealth 
tax proposal referenced herein, the authors omitted retirement accounts 
from the wealth tax base.60 This was done to reflect the favorable treatment 
given to retirement accounts under current law.61 As noted in the proposal, it 
would be possible to deal with retirement accounts by imposing a tax to be 
collected from the account itself.62 In this way, the burden of the tax on the 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See supra notes 35–52 and accompanying text. 
 57 For a general description, see Art Appraisal Services, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://
www.irs.gov/Individuals/Art-Appraisal-Services [https://perma.cc/36GJ-9BZK]. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Raub & Newcomb, supra note 34, at 169–70 & tbl.1 (showing art as 0.79% of all 
wealth, more than 80% of which is held by persons with net worth over $20 million). The author 
calculated these percentages. 
 60 Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 25, at 533–34 (explaining that retirement accounts were 
excluded from the net worth portion of the wealth tax and contributions to retirement accounts 
would be excluded from the wage tax). 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
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beneficiary of the account would not necessarily equal the amount of the tax 
collected from the retirement account, in the same way that each dollar in 
the retirement account is not necessarily worth a dollar to the owner of the 
account. In the context of the proposal, the authors did not push to include 
retirement accounts in the wealth tax base, because, among other reasons, it 
would then become difficult to determine how to distribute the burden of 
such a tax to taxpayers based on available data.63 
In any event, one lesson from this discussion is that, in the context of a 
wealth tax, the valuation problem may be solved by considering a structure 
that collects the tax from the entity whose value is difficult to determine, 
rather than by making the valuation with respect to the owner of the asset. 
IV. DISTINGUISHING INCOME FROM LABOR AND CAPITAL 
A. In General 
Although the wealth tax proposal previously described had only a zero 
bracket amount and two flat rates, there is one obvious area where tax plan-
ning is possible and, therefore, rules will be needed to deal with the issue. 
Because income from capital is not taxed (capital itself is taxed), there 
could be a strong push to convert any amounts paid to a shareholder-
employee from wages (taxed at about eighteen percent) to dividends, which 
are not taxed at all. This is not a new issue to the tax law, as there is a histo-
ry of litigation in which taxpayer-employees of C corporations attempt to 
characterize distributions from their corporations as deductible wages rather 
than non-deductible dividends.64 Because the differences in the rates of div-
idends and wages are so great, it is likely that this will be an area of contro-
versy between the IRS and taxpayers. Moreover, the issue is expanded un-
der a wealth tax because the self-employed will want to distinguish between 
their income that arises from their own efforts (taxed at the higher wage 
rate) and their income that arises from the capital used in their self-
employment activities (taxed only as additional wealth). 
The issue of correctly characterizing the salaries paid to owners of a 
closely held business is very important for valuing such businesses. As 
such, it receives attention from those interested in valuing a business. Not 
surprisingly, in a book about business valuation co-authored by a tax court 
                                                                                                                           
 63 See id. 
 64 See generally Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co. v. Comm’r, 680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 
2012) (affirming Tax Court’s holding that the IRS properly reclassified consulting fees as divi-
dends rather than wages). 
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judge, the need to examine the salaries paid to owners of the business is 
highlighted.65 
B. Dual-Income Tax Systems 
A possible solution to the problem could be found by looking at coun-
tries that have dual-income tax systems. Dual-income tax systems have ex-
perience distinguishing income from labor and capital. Nordic countries 
introduced dual-income tax systems in various forms starting in the late 
1980s.66 These systems impose a flat tax on income from capital yet main-
tain a progressive tax schedule for income from labor.67 The lowest personal 
marginal rate for income is set at the capital rate, but additional taxes on 
labor push the rates higher than for capital income.68 
When an individual runs a business, either as a sole proprietorship or a 
closely held corporation, it is necessary to distinguish between a return on 
the proprietor’s capital (taxed at a lower rate) and a return on the proprie-
tor’s labor (taxed at higher, graduated rates). The Nordic systems deal with 
this problem by imputing a fixed return on the capital invested in the activi-
ty and treating that as the return on capital.69 Other income derived from the 
business is treated as labor income.70 
The basis for imposing a lower tax rate on capital than on labor is that, 
to a significant degree, income from labor has a distinct advantage over in-
come from capital.71 Investments that generate income from capital are 
amortized over time, with deductions ideally matching the actual decrease 
in value of the capital investment.72 When the investment is deducted im-
                                                                                                                           
 65 See LARO & PRATT, supra note 49, at 138 (citing Estate of Renier v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 401 (2000)).  
 66 See Søren Bo Nielsen & Peter Birch Sørensen, On the Optimality of the Nordic System of 
Dual Income Taxation, 63 J. PUB. ECON. 311, 311–12 (1997). Based on Bloomberg BNA Tax 
Management Portfolios, at least Finland and Sweden still have such systems. See infra note 69 and 
accompanying text. 
 67 Nielsen & Sørensen, supra note 66, at 311–12. 
 68 Id. at 312, 315. 
 69 See Petri Manninen & Kalle Kyläkallio, Portfolio 7120-1st: Business Operations in Fin-
land, BLOOMBERG BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, at pt. X.C (discussing how Finland distin-
guishes between different forms of income, including capital income); Espen Nordbø & Eva Linn 
Gjerlaug, Portfolio 7280-1st: Business Operations in Norway, Bloomberg BNA TAX MGMT. 
PORTFOLIOS, at pt. XIII.C (discussing how Norway treats income from capital differently than 
other forms of income); Peter Sjögren & Roland S. Dahlman, Portfolio 985-4th: Business Opera-
tions in Sweden, BLOOMBERG BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIOS, at pt. X.C (discussing how Sweden 
treats different forms of income distinctly). 
 70 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 71 See generally Nielsen & Sørensen, supra note 66 (providing an extended discussion of the 
dual tax systems and why capital is taxed at a lower rate than labor). 
 72 Paul A. Samuelson, Tax Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant Valua-
tions, 72 J. POL. ECON. 604, 604–06 (1964). Paul Samuelson proves that a stream of income from 
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mediately, and the investor is able to make use of that deduction, the in-
vestment effectively generates tax-free income.73 In contrast to the usual 
treatment of capital expenditures, a major investment in developing labor 
skills—the opportunity cost of pursuing additional education—is effectively 
deducted immediately, inasmuch as the individual is generating no income 
to tax. This argument has been made with particular force in the Nordic 
countries, which are generous in providing low-cost education.74 In the 
United States, where education costs are high and are generally not deducti-
ble for tax purposes, the argument loses some of its force.75 
Another perceived advantage of dual-tax systems is that they reduce 
taxes on income from capital while maintaining a progressive income tax 
system. To the extent that those who argue for a consumption tax emphasize 
the need to reduce the burden of tax on capital investment, the dual-tax sys-
tems move in the direction supported by consumption tax advocates.76 
One scholar has suggested that a dual-income tax system might be 
adopted in the United States.77 The proposal recognizes, as did the archi-
tects of the Nordic systems, that a major concern in any such system is the 
need to distinguish income from labor and income from capital because 
they are taxed at different rates.78 In particular, it is difficult to separate an 
owner-manager’s return from an enterprise into its components of labor and 
capital.79 
This distinction is important under current law in the United States for 
a number of different reasons.80 A distribution to an owner-employee will 
                                                                                                                           
a depreciable asset will be valued by all taxpayers equally, no matter what tax rate they are subject 
to, if the depreciation allowed on the asset equals its actual economic loss of value. Id. When that 
procedure is followed, there is no tax incentive for a high-bracket taxpayer to buy an asset from a 
low-bracket taxpayer, or vice versa. Id. 
 73 See Theodore Sims, Debt, Accelerated Depreciation, and the Tale of a Teakettle: Tax-
Shelter Abuse Reconsidered, 42 UCLA. L. REV. 263, 280–82 (1994). 
 74 See Nielsen & Sørensen, supra note 66, at 322. 
 75 Normally a capital expenditure, such as the purchase of a machine, reflects the loss of an 
asset (the cost of the machine) with no immediate deduction for tax purposes. In the case of a 
taxpayer who extends the period of education rather than entering the workforce, however, the 
“expenditure” consists of the earnings the taxpayer would have had which the taxpayer foregoes. 
That can be thought of as a receipt of income and its immediate deduction. To that extent, students 
in the United States have the same benefit as those in the Nordic countries. To the extent that 
students in the United States must pay for their education, however, with no deduction at any point 
for tax purposes, they are at a relative disadvantage. 
 76 See Edward Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 NW. J.L. & 
SOC. POL’Y 40, 46 (2010). 
 77 See generally id. (proposing United States policymakers consider adopting a dual-income 
tax system). 
 78 See id. at 45, 49–52. 
 79 Id. at 49–52. 
 80 See id.; Daniel N. Shaviro, Evaluating the Case for 1986-Style Corporate Tax Reform, 145 
TAX NOTES 1267, 1272–73 (2014). 
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be deductible if it is salary, but not if it is a dividend.81 On the recipient’s 
side, though, the dividend will currently be taxed at a lower rate than sala-
ry.82 On the other hand, if the business is a pass-through entity such as an S 
corporation, the salary payment will attract additional employment tax obli-
gations that do not arise if the payment is a distribution of profits.83 This 
labor-capital dichotomy also underlies the difficulties that have arisen in 
settling on the proper tax to be applied to “carried interests.”84 The distinc-
tion between income from labor and income from capital has been de-
scribed by more than one author discussing the Nordic systems as the 
“Achilles heel” of this structure.85 
In the context of the wealth tax described here, the issue becomes more 
complicated. Although it is true that wages are taxed at a rate almost ten 
times that of wealth, it is also true that a business may be valued by apply-
ing a multiple to its profits.86 To take a very simple case, suppose the rate on 
labor income were 18% and the rate on wealth were 1.8%. Suppose also 
that the value of a business were determined by applying to its profits a 
multiple of ten. Then $100 of salary would attract an $18 tax liability when 
received by the owner. That $100 deductible payment, however, would re-
duce the business’s income. Using a multiple of ten, that would reduce the 
value of the business by $1000, reducing the wealth tax on the business by 
1.8% of $1000, or the same $18. Thus, in this situation, the tax authorities 
would not care how the $100 was characterized: if it is deductible salary, it 
attracts a tax under the labor portion of the wealth tax. But if it is a nonde-
ductible dividend, it remains part of the profits of the business and increases 
the value of the business that is taxed under the capital portion of the wealth 
tax.  
Although actual cases will not be so neat, the interplay between the 
payment of salary and the profitability of the business should serve to re-
duce, at least somewhat, the tension between salary and distributions of 
profits. Because the Nordic systems will tax the hypothetical $100 payment 
under an income tax structure, but will apply different rates depending on 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co., 680 F.3d at 869–70. 
 82 Id. at 870. 
 83 Proposals to end this perceived loophole have been offered. See, e.g., Lindsey McPherson, 
Democrats List Tax Targets for Elimination in Budget Talks, 141 TAX NOTES 591, 591 (2013). 
 84 See DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22689, TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS 5 (2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22689.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9J5A-Z65K] (discussing the tax treatment of carried interests). 
 85 Annette Alstadsaeter, The Achilles Heel of the Dual Income Tax: The Norwegian Case, 20 
FINNISH ECON. PAPERS 5, 5–7 (2007); Peter B. Sørensen, Dual Income Taxes: A Nordic Tax 
System 9 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econ.ku.dk/pbs/diversefiler/DUAL%20
INCOME%20TAXES%20OUCBT.pdf [https://perma.cc/JH9K-F366]. 
 86 See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 25, at 541. As noted in the original article, this point 
was first brought to the authors’ attention by Professor James Repetti. Id. at 541 n.96. 
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the character of the income, this interplay between deductible payments and 
value does not arise in those systems to reduce the significance of the wage-
dividend distinction. 
Note how this wealth tax structure affects the controversial issue of 
carried interests. A carried interest is compensation that a hedge fund or pri-
vate equity fund manager receives through the appreciation of an interest in 
a business that the manager is helping to run.87 The manager realizes this 
profit when the manager sells the interest.88 Normal tax principles would 
classify this as a favorably taxed capital gain.89 This result has been criti-
cized by some because the source of the profit earned is essentially the 
manager’s work for the company, and arguably should be treated as ordi-
nary income.90 
Under a wealth tax, the manager would receive the ownership interest 
in the managed entity as wage income when received. At that time the own-
ership interest would presumably not be worth very much. Thereafter, the 
manager would continue to be taxed on the presumably increasing value of 
those ownership interests, because the wealth tax would not wait for an 
event—such as the sale of the ownership interest—in order to begin taxing 
the manager. Although the wealth tax rate that the manager would pay 
would be lower than if taxation were deferred until sale of the ownership 
interest, the manager would be taxed sooner and regularly on the value of 
the ownership interest. 
V. ECONOMIC EFFECTS 
A. How Should Capital Income Be Taxed? 
It seems obvious that a tax on capital income will discourage saving 
and hinder economic growth. Because the tax reduces the return on invest-
ment, it should discourage people from investing. If less money is invested, 
economic growth should be reduced. 
Despite the obvious nature of this conclusion, there is no consensus 
that this is the case. One scholar recently concluded: “On balance, academic 
research supports a skeptical view of the assertion that capital income taxa-
tion hinders economic growth.”91 
                                                                                                                           
 87 MARPLES, supra note 84, at 4. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 4–5. 
 90 See id. at 5. 
 91 Chris Sanchirico, Do Capital Income Taxes Hinder Growth? (U. of Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for 
Law & Econ., Wharton Pub. Pol’y Initiative, Research Paper No. 13-6, Feb. 22, 2013), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222843 [https://perma.cc/M9MR-58DC]. 
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Taxing capital under a wealth tax can be viewed as an income tax on 
the risk-free return from capital, with no tax on the return to risk-bearing 
and inframarginal returns.92 No adjustment need be made for inflation.93 
Using round numbers, if the risk-free return on capital is 5%, a 1.5% tax on 
wealth is equivalent to a 30% tax on that expected income,94 with an after-
tax return of 3.5% (plus whatever risk-bearing and inframarginal return i is 
earned). If inflation drives returns up to 10%, a 1.5% tax on wealth is 
equivalent to a 15% tax on income. It may be viewed more accurately, in 
income tax terms, as a 30% tax on expected returns (with no tax on inflation 
returns or on i). 
Whether it is sensible to effectively tax only the expected return on an 
asset depends in part on whether the evaluation starts with assuming an in-
come tax norm or a wealth tax norm. From an income tax standpoint, it 
seems odd that the same tax is imposed no matter what income is generated. 
From a wealth tax standpoint, it would be odd if the tax on an asset, the val-
ue of which has not changed, varied every year. Even from an income tax 
perspective, it is wrong to tax returns due solely to inflation, and odd that no 
tax is imposed under a realization-based income tax when the value of 
property increases but the property is not disposed of. In contrast, a wealth 
tax takes account of all changes in value, and effectively does not tax in-
come from inflation. 
A loss under the wealth tax described here will only reduce future tax 
liability by 1.6% of the loss. It is important to recognize, though, that this 
reduction will continue to be given annually. Using the example of a 5% 
expected return, the reduction in tax resulting from the loss in value would 
have a present value that increases the longer the property is held. If it is 
held for five years, the decrease is 6.93%; ten years, 12.36%; twenty years, 
19.94%. 
As can be seen, a loss on an asset that will be held for a long time 
translates into a significant tax reduction. Note that this is a wealth tax 
measure, not an income tax measure. That is, the loss in value translates 
into a significant reduction in what the wealth tax would have been had the 
value not been lost. Moreover, in a sense this value is lost forever. That is, 
because realization events are of no moment under the wealth tax, the loss 
will continue to be reflected in the taxpayer’s asset base if the taxpayer sells 
this asset and reinvests the proceeds in another asset. So there is no reason 
to think of this table as the present value of a loss on a particular asset. It is 
simply a loss from the taxpayer’s asset base, no matter whether the particu-
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 25, at 522–23. 
 93 See id. at 523. 
 94 Note that 1.5% is 30% of the 5% expected return. 
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lar asset is held, sold, or given away. The calculation ends when the pro-
ceeds are consumed rather than reinvested.95 
Of course, this applies equally to increases in value. Thus, an increase 
in value, although taxed at only a 1.6% rate, is taxed every year that it re-
mains in the taxpayer’s asset base until that value is consumed. 
B. Effects of the Proposed Wealth Tax 
Much recent tax scholarship has compared the income tax and a con-
sumption tax, and has favored switching our tax system to a consumption 
tax.96 The simple reason is that a consumption tax seems more likely to fa-
vor saving compared to our current tax system (which is a hybrid income-
consumption tax system). The debate, however, has arguably shifted away 
from favoring a pure consumption tax towards favoring an income tax.97 
Some advocate a value-added tax to supplement, and reduce the rates of, the 
income tax.98 In the face of an extended period of focus on an income tax 
and a consumption tax, Professor Piketty’s advocacy of a wealth tax99 has 
attracted substantial interest. 
One problem with much of the analysis of a wealth tax is that it has 
been done from the standpoint of an income tax. The wealth tax may appear 
to tax the wrong people, to the extent that it can apply a significant tax lia-
bility to someone who has little income. But if instead wealth is seen as the 
best indicator of who should bear the tax burden, it would follow that the 
income tax, in fact, seems to play a peculiar role. The income tax distorts 
investment decisions because of its realization requirement.100 As a result, 
people naturally want to invest in assets that do not have a current return in 
order to avoid the income tax. And even if the realization requirement were 
                                                                                                                           
 95 It could equally well be said that these figures reflect the present value of the tax reduction 
generated by selling an investment and using the proceeds for consumption. Note that the same 
sort of calculation could be made with respect to the income tax when, for example, someone sells 
a fixed-income investment and spends the proceeds on a vacation. 
 96 See generally Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach, Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior 
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Historical Perspective, 146 TAX NOTES 247 (2015) (pointing out that there is limited support for a 
consumption tax outside of academia). 
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 99 See generally PIKETTY, supra note 9 (proposing a wealth tax). 
 100 See generally Shakow, supra note 33 (discussing the merits of an accrual method of taxa-
tion over the current realization requirement). 
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removed from the income tax, the result would be that a taxpayer’s annual 
success would determine the taxpayer’s burden, even when two taxpayers 
are basically in the same wealth category. In other words, a wealthy person 
whose activities do not generate gain in the current year need not contribute 
to the government as much as a person working for the minimum wage. To 
look at it another way, a wealth tax is more likely to keep taxpayers’ tax 
burdens at more or less the same level from year to year, as opposed to an 
income tax, which can lead to substantial fluctuations in tax burdens from 
year to year. From a wealth tax perspective, not surprisingly, the income tax 
result seems wrong. 
VI. LOCAL PROPERTY TAX 
A. Drawing Support from Implementation 
Part of the argument in this Article is that, because the tax rate on 
wealth is so low, the projected effects that would follow a logical analysis 
are not likely to occur. 
Some support for this assertion can be found in the relationship be-
tween property tax rates and homeownership in the United States. If proper-
ty tax rates affected homeownership, it might be expected that states with 
higher property taxes would have lower rates of homeownership. In fact, 
there is no significant correlation between property tax rates and homeown-
ership.101 And what correlation exists is positive, although admittedly not 
significant.102 This suggests that, if anything, higher tax rates encourage 
homeownership. But perhaps using property tax rates is misleading, as 
higher rates may simply reflect higher incomes in the states where those 
higher rates are found. To correct for that, we can divide the property tax 
level by the average income per capita in each state. Running the correla-
tion again, there was still no significant correlation, and the non-significant 
correlation that was found (0.197) was still positive.103 
Although it would seem easy to extrapolate lessons from the property 
tax to a more general wealth tax, an examination of the property tax litera-
ture reflects many of the problems that exist with that approach. First, at 
least some of the costs of property taxes get reflected in the value of the 
house.104 A careful examination of this issue over twenty-five years ago 
concluded that only about thirty percent of the expense of real estate taxes 
                                                                                                                           
 101 See infra app. tbl.1. 
 102 See infra app. tbl.1. 
 103 See infra app. tbl.1. 
 104 JOHN YINGER ET AL., PROPERTY TAXES AND HOUSE VALUES: THE THEORY AND ESTI-
MATION OF INTRAJURISDICTIONAL PROPERTY TAX CAPITALIZATION 1–3, 51–52 (1988) (studying 
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is reflected in home values.105 Those authors speculated that the reason 
there was not more capitalization of real estate taxes is that buyers expect 
that real estate valuations would change in relatively short order.106 A sim-
pler explanation, which reflects that same point, is that differences in prop-
erty tax burdens are included in homeowners’ property valuations only to 
the extent it is expected that the assessment will not change to reflect actual 
property values.107 
B. Generalizing from the Property Tax 
Drawing lessons from local property taxes is complicated further by 
the “Tiebout Model.”108 Charles Tiebout’s insight was that the services of-
fered by local governments were an important factor in locational deci-
sions.109 Accordingly, if local property taxes are used to pay for those ser-
vices, taxpayers will choose the community they wish to live in based on 
the services offered.110 Taking that analysis to its extreme, two identical 
houses located close to each other in different governmental jurisdictions, 
but subject to different property tax rates, could have exactly the same price 
but with potential buyers choosing between the two based on which collec-
tion of local services they would prefer to pay for with their taxes. 
Such an extreme view is clearly overstated, because we recognize that 
many other factors play a role in a person’s decision to purchase a house in a 
particular location. 111 But the Tiebout Model undercuts any attempt to draw 
conclusions about how people react to increases in their property taxes. 
As a result of court decisions in a number of states, the connection be-
tween taxes paid and the quality of one major service provided locally—
schooling—has been attenuated. This makes the Tiebout Model much less 
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 107 William A. Fischel, Review of Property Taxes and House Values: The Theory and Estima-
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relevant in those states. In California and Florida, notably, school funding 
comes through the state, and expenditures on schooling in a local district 
are not a function of the amount of property taxes paid in that school dis-
trict.112 Perhaps more significantly, in both California and Florida, the high-
est-poverty districts receive about the same percentage of state and local 
funds per student as the lowest-poverty districts (adjusting for the additional 
needs of low-income students).113 As a result, it can be said, with more as-
surance than in other jurisdictions, that a potential buyer should be looking 
at property tax levels mostly divorced from the services that the taxpayer 
will receive in that location.  
One aspect of the property tax regime that can be explored in Califor-
nia and Florida is the extent to which taxpayers challenge their real estate 
tax assessments. Both states publish annually a very detailed description of 
the challenges made to real estate assessments. The data in both states are 
complicated by rules that limit the state’s power to increase assessments on 
owner-occupied homes to fair market value. In California, Proposition 13 
limits an annual increase in the assessment of a residence to one percent 
(and the assessment can never exceed fair market value).114 The assessment 
is adjusted to actual market value (the sale price) whenever a sale takes 
place.115 As a result of this system, in a rising market, houses that have been 
held for a long time will become more and more undervalued. 
In Florida, the limits on assessment increases have been 3% on home-
steads since 1993 or 1994, and 10% on others since 2009.116 Data from 
Florida shows that the level of appeals was fairly low, but started rising in 
2007.117 This presumably reflects the fall in Florida real estate values, 
which steadily declined from a high in 2006 until 2012.118 This decline also 
attracted “tax reps”—people who would handle assessment appeals on a 
contingent basis.119 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 569 P.2d 1303 (Cal. 1977); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 
(Cal. 1976); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
 113 NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, THE EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2015, at 5 
fig.2 (2015), http://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/FundingGaps2015_TheEducationTrust1.
pdf [https://perma.cc/G57R-NZK6]. 
 114 CAL. CONST. art. XIII.A, § 1. 
 115 For a description of the California property tax system, see generally CAL. STATE BD. OF 
EQUALIZATION, CALIFORNIA PROPERTY TAX: AN OVERVIEW (2015), http://www.boe.ca.gov/
proptaxes/pdf/pub29.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ8K-K5Z4]. 
 116 Details of the situation in Florida were learned in a discussion with Lizette Kelly. Tele-
phone Interview with Lizette Kelly, Fla. Dep’t of Revenue (Aug. 20, 2015); see also FLA. DEP’T 
OF EDUC., 2015–16 FUNDING FOR FLORIDA SCHOOL DISTRICTS (2015), http://www.fldoe.org/
core/fileparse.php/7507/urlt/Fefpdist.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVY9-QBGJ]. 
 117 See infra app. tbl.2. 
 118 See Florida Home Prices & Values, ZILLOW, http://www.zillow.com/fl/home-values/ [https://
perma.cc/T5VZ-L96M]. 
 119 Telephone call with Lizette Kelly, supra note 116. 
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The question most relevant for the purposes of this Article is whether 
the level of assessment appeals in these states suggests how many contro-
versies might arise under a federal wealth tax. When estimating whether the 
data for real estate appeals would be duplicated in a federal wealth tax, note 
that the real estate assessment process involves an initial valuation from the 
government. In contrast, the wealth tax described here is one based on self-
assessments. It is also worth noting that the highest percentages of appeals 
can be found in Florida’s two largest counties, Dade and Broward.120 The 
large number of properties there presumably serves as an inducement for 
tax reps. In addition, those counties have significant numbers of condomin-
iums.121 If a representative is hired to challenge the assessment of a condo-
minium development, the number of appeals recorded will be the number of 
units in the development.122 So again, the attraction of representing such a 
development is quite great, as even a small reduction applied to a large 
number of units can lead to a significant payday for the tax rep.123 
VII. OTHER POTENTIAL PROBLEMS 
A. Expatriation 
When Professor Piketty suggested the adoption of a wealth tax, he rec-
ognized that such a proposal would be much easier to accept if all nations 
were to adopt such a tax system.124 The proposal in this Article, however, is 
limited to a U.S. wealth tax. Does that mean that many U.S. citizens will 
expatriate in order to avoid such an estate tax? 
The goal of Professor Piketty’s wealth tax is to reduce the concentra-
tion of wealth among the wealthiest individuals in the world.125 The goal of 
the wealth tax proposed here is more limited: to produce a tax system that is 
easier to administer than the current system, and is at least as fair. In struc-
turing this wealth tax, an attempt was made to keep the burden of the in-
come tax roughly where it is currently. Of course, this is being done only on 
an income-group-by-income-group basis. Undoubtedly, particular individu-
als may find that this wealth tax does substantially increase their tax liabili-
ties. 
It is not easy to determine whether adopting a wealth tax would lead to 
a substantial increase in expatriations. As the United States has increased its 
attempts to impose a tax on taxpayers with foreign holdings of income-
                                                                                                                           
 120 See infra app. tbl.2. 
 121 Telephone Interview with Lizette Kelly, supra note 116. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 See PIKETTY, supra note 9, at 515–18. 
 125 See id. 
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producing properties, expatriation has increased.126 It is not yet clear, how-
ever, to what extent these expatriation totals reflect U.S. residents leaving 
the country, as opposed to U.S. citizens (often dual citizens) escaping the 
substantial burden of complying with U.S. disclosure rules that target tax-
avoiding residents. 
B. Foreign Issues 
How would non-resident foreigners be treated under this system? If 
they are to be incorporated under the wealth tax, the current system of with-
holding and bilateral treaties, which depend on income items,127 will have 
to be rethought. Although it may be possible to withhold on actual pay-
ments based on the value of the asset that generated the income item, a new 
structure would be needed for assets that do not generate current income. 
More importantly, the wealth tax would seem at odds with the methods that 
have been adopted internationally to allocate tax collections among differ-
ent countries.128 
In the absence of a global movement to a wealth tax, it would seem 
that a withholding system based on actual payments may have to remain in 
place for non-residents. This would appear to create incentives, in some 
cases, to move appreciating assets into the hands of non-residents. These 
would not, however, be new incentives; under current law, non-residents do 
not pay tax on most gains from the sale of assets in the United States.129 
C. The Liquidity Issue 
When considering a tax system in which liabilities are based on valua-
tions, the issue of liquidity becomes very important. Because the tax is as-
sessed on values, and the tax rate (albeit low compared to the current rate) 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Andrew Velarde, Expatriations Ramp up to Even Higher Annual Record Pace, 149 TAX 
NOTES 624, 624 (2015); Robert W. Wood, New Un-American Record: Renouncing U.S. Citizenship, 
FORBES (May 8, 2015), http://web.archive.org/web/20160403192136/http://www.forbes.com/
sites/robertwood/2015/05/08/new-un-american-record-renouncing-u-s-citizenship/#7ad41fa23d0d. 
 127 U.S. payors withhold on items of income of non-residents. I.R.C. §§ 871, 881 (2012). Our 
bilateral tax treaties are predominantly income tax treaties. 
 128 Countries enter into bilateral income tax treaties to allocate tax burdens between them. The 
major project for international tax reform, spearheaded by the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development, (“OECD”) deals with base erosion and profit shifting (“BEPS”). 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/
ctp/beps.htm [https://perma.cc/CX5A-ZG4J]; see also Orly Mazur, Transfer Pricing Challenges in 
the Cloud, 57 B.C. L. REV. 643, 646–67 (2016) (discussing the OECD’s action plan to address 
BEPS). 
 129 See I.R.C. § 871(a)(1) (taxing income other than gains). But see I.R.C. § 897 (2012) (tax-
ing disposition of U.S. real estate). 
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is not insignificant, there certainly could be taxpayers who experience li-
quidity problems. 
In the context of the wealth tax as discussed here, however, liquidity is 
much less significant than it appears. To the extent of the wage tax portion 
of the wealth tax, where taxpayers are normally paid in cash, the rate for 
many taxpayers is lower than the rate under current law, and so no particu-
lar liquidity issue would seem relevant. 
For the other portion of the wealth tax, a rate of, say, 1.6% on the net 
value of all assets, the low rate should mean that, for most taxpayers, liquid-
ity is not a major issue. Although many assets will not produce cash returns 
on an annual basis, it is reasonable to expect that almost all taxpayers will 
have sufficient diversity in their portfolios that some of those assets will be 
liquid assets and assets producing cash returns, which can be used to pay 
the tax. For the small number of taxpayers for whom this is not true, the 
solutions that exist under our income tax may well suffice.130 It may be nec-
essary to sell some assets to have cash for the payment of taxes. But be-
cause this issue arises under current law, and the distribution of the wealth 
tax appears similar to that of the current income tax structure, it is likely 
that very few taxpayers will be in a more difficult position under a wealth 
tax system than under current law. 
D. Retirees and Transition Issues 
The burden of the wealth tax described here weighs more heavily on 
those in the lowest adjusted-gross-income group than the current income 
tax. The reason for this is twofold. First, some of the taxpayers in the lowest 
adjusted-gross-income bracket are wealthy individuals whose income fluc-
tuates from year to year. Thus, they may find themselves in the lowest in-
come bracket one particular year, even though over a period of years, they 
would be in a much higher bracket. There is no problem, from an equity 
standpoint, in taxing such people based on their actual wealth. 
The larger group of individuals who will be taxed at a higher rate un-
der this wealth tax (compared to the current income tax) are retirees. Retir-
ees on relatively small incomes would not be affected, as the main sources 
of their wealth—their homes (mortgages which they may already have paid 
off) and their pensions—are excluded from the base of the wealth tax.131 
Although distributions from pension plans will be taxed at the same rate as 
wages, this should not make a big difference in the burden that would fall 
on typical retirees (compared to their current income tax burden). This is 
because distributions from tax-favored retirement plans are taxed as ordi-
                                                                                                                           
 130 I.R.C. § 6159 (2012) (permitting installment payment of taxes). 
 131 See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 25, at 533–36. 
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nary income under current law,132 and the rate on such income under the 
wealth tax is usually lower than under our current income tax system. 
Will those retirees who accumulated substantial wealth, but received 
little income from those investments in the past, find themselves subject to 
a heavier tax burden under this wealth tax than they would under the in-
come tax? Consider a sixty-five-year-old who has accumulated savings out-
side a retirement account. Such a person could invest those savings and re-
ceive a guaranteed return of about 6%.133 At the current second bracket tax 
rate of 28%, that would be the equivalent of a wealth tax of 1.68%. Using 
the 15% first bracket, it is equivalent to a wealth tax rate of only 0.9%.134 
As a transitional issue, does this raise any significant concerns? For in-
stance, the wealth that has been accumulated under the income tax has al-
ready been taxed under that tax system. If it is now taxed like any other 
wealth, those who accumulated their wealth under the income tax will com-
plain that they are being taxed on essentially the same item of value. This 
issue would concern not only retirees, but anyone who accumulated wealth 
under the income tax system. 
The author tentatively suggests that a relatively short transitional peri-
od—from five to ten years—should be adopted, during which both a wealth 
tax and an income tax would be in place. Taxpayers holding assets accumu-
lated in the pre-wealth-tax period could elect to be taxed under the income 
tax system during the transitional period. Because the wealth tax can be 
viewed as an income tax on an asset’s risk-free return, the main disad-
vantage to taxpayers in operating under the wealth tax is that it requires no 
realization events and does not give substantial benefits for losses. On the 
other hand, for taxpayers who are still working, the lower rate on wages 
may well make the wealth tax regime more appealing. Thus, for most tax-
payers, operating under the wealth tax system will not result in a substantial 
disadvantage, and the transitional problems may not be as formidable as 
they may initially appear. 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 402 (2012) (taxing beneficiary of otherwise tax-exempt retirement plan 
trust under the rules for annuities, which results in ordinary income except to the extent the em-
ployee made after-tax contributions to the plan). 
 133 A calculator at the Fidelity website gives a monthly payment of $498 for a sixty-five-year-old 
male investing in an annuity with a guaranteed return of the original investment. See Guaranteed 
Income Estimator, FIDELITY, https://gie.fidelity.com/estimator/jsp/IncomeDuration.jsp?cola=false 
[https://perma.cc/2FVU-DVJU]. 
 134 For this rough calculation, assume the effect of the zero brackets in both systems will be 
equivalent. 
972 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:947 
E. Constitutionality 
There is no question that the constitutionality of a wealth tax is debat-
able. Professors Bankman and Shaviro, in their recent discussion of Piket-
ty’s book, conclude that a full-blown wealth tax would not pass muster un-
der a constitutional evaluation.135 They recognize the arguments in favor of 
the constitutionality of a wealth tax,136 but they are not persuaded.137 Like-
wise, they believe that the current Supreme Court has signaled that it would 
not be sympathetic to an argument in favor of the constitutionality of a 
wealth tax.138 
The possible unconstitutionality of a wealth tax is not a good reason 
for disregarding it in the public discourse, however. It would take a great 
deal of public discussion for a significant percentage of the populace to 
consider a wealth tax a viable possible alternative. If and when that hap-
pens, it may be possible to confront the constitutional issue directly with an 
amendment to the Constitution, if needed. 
VIII. AN OVERALL EVALUATION 
This Part summarizes the issues that should be considered in evaluat-
ing the wealth tax as described thus far.139 
Inflation: The income tax overtaxes investment returns in times of in-
flation.140 Solutions to this problem are complicated, and even in times of 
substantial inflation, there has not been sufficient political will to devise a 
solution.141 The wealth tax does not tax the return arising from inflation.142 
                                                                                                                           
 135 Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 30, at 46–49. 
 136 See id.; see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1999); Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of the Consti-
tution, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998); John T. Plecnik, The New Flat Tax: A Modest Pro-
posal for a Constitutionally Apportioned Wealth Tax, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483 (2013); 
Deborah Schenk, Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423 (2000). 
 137 Bankman & Shaviro, supra note 30, at 47 (stating that an unapportioned wealth tax would 
face a strong constitutional challenge). 
 138 Id. at 47 n.102 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132. S. Ct. 2566, 2599 
(2012)); see also Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule of Apportionment 
Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 875–82 (2009) (analyzing Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on direct taxes). But see Jasper Cummings, Form, Substance, and PPL, 140 TAX 
NOTES 365, 367 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in PPL Corp. v. Commissioner 
may have unintentionally supported an unapportioned federal wealth tax). 
 139 These categories come from Sørensen, supra note 85, at 7–8. 
 140 RONALD REAGAN, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX PROPOSALS TO CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, 
GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 135 (1985), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
analysis/Documents/OTA-Report-Reform-Proposal-1985.pdf, [https://perma.cc/NB29-GG3C] (“Thus, 
pre-[Accelerated Cost Recovery System] depreciation deductions for many assets understated real 
economic depreciation and thus resulted in overtaxation of the income from such assets.”). 
 141 See id. at 139 (adjusting depreciation allowances for inflation); id. at 169 (adjusting basis 
of capital assets for inflation); id. at 175–76 (indexing inventories for inflation). 
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Capital mobility: As the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
Development’s BEPS Project143 recognizes, significant problems stem from 
the ability of taxpayers to move capital from one jurisdiction to another in 
order to minimize their tax liabilities.144 One simple suggestion for reducing 
capital flight is to reduce the rate of tax on capital. Arguably, this wealth tax 
does that. 
Tax neutrality: Proponents of a dual-tax system suggest the following 
support for their proposal: 
Capital income accrues in many forms, some of which are hard to 
tax (for practical or political reasons). Lowering the tax rate on 
those types of capital income that can be taxed reduces the distor-
tions arising when certain types of capital income cannot be in-
cluded in the tax base. A low tax rate also makes it easier to 
broaden the tax base, for instance by including capital gains with-
out causing severe lock-in effects.145 
If the valuation issues are satisfactorily dealt with, no significant form of 
capital need be omitted from the wealth tax system. The wealth tax imposes 
a low rate on capital, and there is no lock-in effect. There is no effect on 
investors’ decisions regarding either risk or liquidity of investments.146 
Tax arbitrage: Because there is only one tax rate on labor income,147 
there is little incentive to shift income among taxpayers, except to take ad-
vantage of unused uniform credits. If the effective rate on labor is relatively 
close to that of capital, the problem of shifting income away from the 
earned income category will be reduced. To the extent it is not eliminated, 
that simply reproduces a problem that already exists in the tax code,148 alt-
hough, in this simplified system, it will loom large to the extent other issues 
no longer exist. 
Clientele effects: Under the income tax, high-income persons prefer 
investments that produce no current income under the realization rules, or 
that produce tax-favored income. Because all forms of capital are taxed the 
                                                                                                                           
 142 See Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 25, at 523. 
 143 Anyone unfamiliar with the BEPS Project, and with time on their hands, is welcome to dip 
into the many reports that have been generated by this project. See generally Mazur, supra note 
128 (explaining the BEPS problem and analyzing the OECD’s proposed solutions); Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting, supra note 128 (providing information about the BEPS Project). 
 144 See About Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS), ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & 
DEV., http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-about.htm [https://perma.cc/8CD9-8R85]. 
 145 Sørensen, supra note 85, at 7. 
 146 See Yair Listokin, Taxation and Liquidity, 120 YALE L.J. 1682, 1730 (2011). 
 147 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (proposing a flat tax on wages). 
 148 See Kleinbard, supra note 76, at 50. 
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same way under the wealth tax, there is no reason for wealthier taxpayers to 
seek out investments that are taxed at a favorable rate. 
Tax administration: The administration of a relatively uncomplicated 
wealth tax system, in which the main issues are those of valuation, should 
be simpler than our current system. 
CONCLUSION: A FINAL THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
If this Article has not convinced you that valuation is not a disqualify-
ing stumbling block for a wealth tax, consider the following thought exper-
iment. Suppose a renegade Congress passes a wealth tax of the type de-
scribed herein, and a congressional committee is now evaluating that wealth 
tax. Suppose there has been a day of witnesses testifying to the recurring 
problems that exist in valuing property for purposes of the wealth tax. You 
now come forward to deliver the coup de grâce to the wealth tax. You come 
before the committee and open your briefcase. You take out two thick vol-
umes of Code and six volumes of regulations, most of which are unneeded 
for purposes of a wealth tax. You turn to the members of the committee and 
say: “This, an income tax, is the solution to our problems.” 
Are you sure that you would convince the members of the committee 
with this presentation? 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Homeownership rates, average property tax, income per capita, and 
average tax as a percentage of income, by state.149 
State 
Homeownership 
Rates (2014) 
Avg. Property Tax 
(2014) 
Income/Capita 
(2011) 
Avg. Tax/Income 
(2014) 
AL 72.1% $752 $34,763 2.16% 
AK 64.9% $2075 $47,354 4.38% 
AZ 63.5% $1483 $35,889 4.13% 
AR 65.4% $1068 $33,182 3.22% 
CA 54.2% $1431 $45,254 3.16% 
CO 65.0% $1089 $46,767 2.33% 
CT 67.4% $3301 $60,287 5.48% 
DE 74.3% $917 $41,521 2.21% 
D.C. 41.5% $1001 $68,795 1.46% 
FL 64.9% $1913 $40,296 4.75% 
GA 62.9% $1675 $36,611 4.58% 
HI 58.4% $482 $44,255 1.09% 
ID 69.6% $1331 $33,741 3.94% 
IL 66.4% $3939 $45,664 8.63% 
IN 70.1% $1507 $35,592 4.23% 
IA 69.4% $2542 $40,147 6.33% 
KS 64.7% $2411 $40,913 5.89% 
KY 67.6% $1445 $33,435 4.32% 
LA 65.3% $832 $37,889 2.20% 
ME 71.0% $2165 $37,701 5.74% 
MD 66.2% $1895 $52,805 3.59% 
                                                                                                                           
 149 LIZ MALM & GERALD PRANTE, TAX FOUND., ANNUAL STATE-LOCAL TAX BURDEN 
RANKING FY 2011, at 6 tbl.1 (2014), http://taxfoundation.org/sites/taxfoundation.org/files/docs/
Burdens_2014_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/SBS6-H6FV] (providing average income); Housing 
Vacancies and Homeownership (CPS/HVS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/
housing/hvs/data/ann14ind.html [https://perma.cc/2GXA-B63A] (providing homeownership rates; 
to view homeownership rates, select “Table 15. Homeownership Rates by State”); John S. 
Kiernan, 2016’s Property Taxes by State, WALLETHUB, http://wallethub.com/edu/states-with-the-
highest-and-lowest-property-taxes/11585/ [https://perma.cc/3BLP-9HUX] (providing average 
property tax). “Real-estate property tax rates . . . [were calculated by] divid[ing] the ‘median real-
estate tax payment’ by the ‘median home price’ . . . . [The author] then used the resulting rates to 
obtain the dollar amount paid as real-estate tax on a house worth $173,200, the median value for a 
home in U.S. [in 2014] . . . .” Kiernan, supra. 
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MA 63.0% $2042 $54,321 3.76% 
MI 73.8% $3168 $36,641 8.65% 
MN 71.4% $2086 $45,552 4.58% 
MS 73.2% $1350 $31,067 4.35% 
MO 70.5% $1749 $37,651 4.65% 
MT 66.9% $1492 $36,407 4.10% 
NE 66.7% $3228 $42,281 7.63% 
NV 56.0% $1620 $39,947 4.06% 
NH 72.2% $3649 $47,349 7.71% 
NJ 65.2% $3971 $54,422 7.30% 
NM 66.3% $1249 $35,328 3.54% 
NY 52.9% $2734 $52,417 5.22% 
NC 66.4% $1471 $36,195 4.06% 
ND 64.5% $2110 $46,218 4.57% 
OH 67.3% $2677 $38,073 7.03% 
OK 69.3% $1499 $37,617 3.98% 
OR 62.8% $1877 $38,219 4.91% 
PA 69.7% $2597 $42,268 6.14% 
RI 61.8% $2779 $44,367 6.26% 
SC 72.9% $984 $33,603 2.93% 
SD 69.2% $2331 $43,212 5.39% 
TN 66.7% $1287 $36,525 3.52% 
TX 62.2% $3327 $41,269 8.06% 
UT 70.9% $1210 $35,224 3.44% 
VT 73.5% $2934 $41,634 7.05% 
VA 68.7% $1369 $48,498 2.82% 
WA 63.6% $1920 $46,456 4.13% 
WV 75.6% $1015 $32,708 3.10% 
WI 67.8% $3398 $40,741 8.34% 
WY 70.8% $1069 $50,805 2.10% 
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Table 2. Percentage of Florida properties for which owners petitioned for 
reassessments, by county.150 
COUNTY 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 
Alachua 0.65% 0.91% 0.70% 0.90% 0.52% 0.02% 0.29% 0.02% 
Baker 0.11% 0.14% 0.07% 0.10% 0.07% 0.27% 0.01% 0.01% 
Bay 1.64% 0.55% 1.29% 0.93% 1.26% 2.29% 4.91% 0.08% 
Bradford 0.08% 0.16% 0.17% 0.09% 0.17% 0.05% 0.12% 0.20% 
Brevard 0.20% 0.34% 0.57% 0.86% 1.35% 0.52% 0.62% 0.17% 
Broward 2.99% 3.41% 3.62% 5.93% 4.24% 3.03% 2.92% 2.48% 
Calhoun 0.03% 0.08% 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
Charlotte 0.37% 0.31% 0.38% 0.42% 0.41% 0.51% 0.39% 0.17% 
Citrus 0.27% 0.26% 0.56% 0.30% 0.59% 1.08% 0.62% 0.15% 
Clay 0.23% 0.28% 0.28% 0.24% 0.92% 0.02% 0.05% 0.00% 
Collier 0.49% 0.58% 0.77% 1.16% 0.40% 0.10% 0.16% 0.02% 
Columbia 0.09% 0.23% 0.06% 0.12% 0.39% 0.00% 0.00% 0.03% 
Dade 8.53% 10.30% 11.65% 15.18% 10.71% 6.53% 5.15% 4.38% 
Desoto 0.18% 0.82% 0.70% 3.61% 1.28% 0.48% 1.05% 0.22% 
Dixie 0.00% 0.04% 0.06% 0.09% 0.29% 0.26% 0.13% 0.16% 
Duval 1.29% 2.20% 1.83% 1.82% 0.91% 0.68% 0.27% 0.30% 
Escambia 0.09% 0.20% 0.13% 0.18% 0.08% 0.50% 0.80% 0.01% 
Flagler 0.26% 0.07% 0.26% 0.44% 0.39% 0.03% 0.12% 0.02% 
Franklin 0.26% 0.19% 0.29% 0.00% 0.89% 0.15% 0.43% 0.08% 
Gadsden 0.08% 0.15% 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00% 
Gilchrist 0.00% 0.04% 0.03% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.05% 0.00% 
Glades 0.02% 0.08% 0.11% 0.31% 0.74% 0.08% 0.15% 0.05% 
Gulf 0.04% 0.07% 0.06% 0.05% 0.48% 0.05% 0.02% 0.04% 
Hamilton 0.01% 0.05% 0.01% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 
Hardee 0.16% 0.11% 0.12% 1.42% 0.17% 0.14% 0.12% 0.21% 
Hendry 0.12% 0.20% 0.19% 0.56% 0.40% 0.30% 4.89% 0.08% 
Hernando 0.41% 0.42% 0.31% 0.22% 0.24% 0.08% 0.07% 0.11% 
Highlands 0.04% 0.04% 0.06% 0.09% 0.05% 0.03% 0.01% 0.01% 
Hillsborough 0.65% 0.63% 0.79% 1.97% 2.73% 1.41% 0.93% 0.51% 
Holmes 0.04% 0.01% 0.06% 0.05% 0.06% 0.02% 0.02% 0.45% 
Indian River 0.52% 0.46% 0.52% 1.39% 1.79% 0.29% 0.19% 0.06% 
Jackson 0.03% 0.06% 0.04% 0.06% 0.03% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 
Jefferson 0.00% 0.31% 0.00% 0.43% 0.06% 0.69% 0.15% 0.03% 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Florida Property Tax Data Portal, FLA. DEP’T OF REVENUE, http://dor.myflorida.com/
dor/property/resources/data.html [https://perma.cc/UXL6-5VLN] (to access appeals data, select 
“VAB Summary”; to access number of parcels, select “Florida Ad Valorem Valuation and Tax 
Data (Data Book)”). 
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Lafayette 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Lake 0.40% 0.31% 0.49% 0.41% 0.27% 0.12% 0.04% 0.01% 
Lee 0.34% 0.42% 0.61% 1.20% 1.31% 1.56% 0.57% 0.20% 
Leon 0.60% 1.52% 0.64% 0.58% 0.34% 0.05% 0.04% 0.03% 
Levy 0.05% 0.03% 0.05% 0.08% 0.04% 0.02% 0.01% 0.01% 
Liberty 0.00% 0.04% 0.02% 0.00% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Madison 0.03% 0.18% 0.01% 0.33% 0.03% 0.01% 0.12% 0.01% 
Manatee 0.34% 0.65% 0.58% 1.34% 0.33% 0.41% 0.25% 0.21% 
Marion 0.09% 0.32% 0.33% 0.40% 0.65% 0.21% 0.08% 0.02% 
Martin 0.38% 0.92% 1.44% 1.85% 1.64% 0.21% 0.05% 0.05% 
Monroe 0.57% 0.70% 1.80% 3.21% 1.44% 0.13% 0.13% 0.09% 
Nassau 1.49% 2.66% 2.83% 2.78% 1.12% 0.43% 0.06% 0.11% 
Okaloosa 0.12% 0.21% 0.15% 0.12% 0.15% 0.03% 0.11% 0.02% 
Okeechobee 0.22% 0.24% 0.25% 0.18% 0.16% 0.03% 0.03% 0.01% 
Orange 0.59% 1.69% 2.12% 3.39% 4.91% 0.61% 0.43% 0.19% 
Osceola 0.33% 0.40% 0.53% 0.40% 0.38% 0.72% 0.01% 0.01% 
Palm Beach 0.99% 1.26% 2.08% 5.96% 2.02% 1.61% 1.10% 0.53% 
Pasco 0.18% 0.27% 0.41% 0.88% 0.41% 0.53% 0.17% 0.13% 
Pinellas 0.29% 0.52% 0.58% 0.62% 0.94% 0.46% 0.37% 0.14% 
Polk 0.19% 0.33% 0.48% 0.61% 0.60% 0.04% 0.03% 0.02% 
Putnam 0.10% 0.11% 0.09% 0.12% 0.38% 0.13% 0.16% 0.06% 
St. Johns 0.19% 0.18% 0.92% 3.70% 1.72% 1.03% 0.08% 0.04% 
St. Lucie 0.55% 0.82% 0.83% 1.97% 1.18% 0.59% 0.29% 0.12% 
Santa Rosa 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.37% 0.01% 0.01% 0.05% 0.05% 
Sarasota 0.27% 0.36% 0.47% 0.75% 0.36% 1.03% 0.43% 0.16% 
Seminole 0.51% 0.46% 0.84% 1.26% 1.20% 0.49% 0.40% 0.27% 
Sumter 0.04% 0.07% 0.06% 0.04% 0.09% 0.02% 0.00% 0.01% 
Suwanee 0.00% 0.05% 0.09% 0.12% 0.09% 0.03% 0.19% 0.03% 
Taylor 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% 0.08% 0.05% 0.04% 0.00% 0.02% 
Union 0.39% 0.25% 0.00% 0.63% 0.62% 1.08% 0.71% 0.59% 
Volusia 0.44% 0.51% 0.80% 1.28% 0.96% 1.48% 1.38% 0.50% 
Wakulla 0.00% 0.47% 0.04% 0.16% 0.01% 0.01% 0.02% 0.00% 
Walton 0.07% 0.58% 0.16% 0.62% 0.16% 0.01% 0.07% 0.02% 
Washington 0.06% 0.22% 0.11% 1.78% 0.01% 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 
TOTALS 1.35% 1.71% 1.98% 3.02% 2.21% 1.35% 1.07% 0.71% 
 
